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In this Article I want to suggest that recent discussions of the role
of religious arguments in debates about public policy sometimes rest
on oversimplified presuppositions. The discussion often seems polarized between two opposing camps. On one side are those who hold
that it is appropriate for citizens to appeal directly to their religious
convictions in advocating positions on policy issues. On the other side
are those who hold that appeal to religious beliefs is always inappropriate in a liberal democratic society. Though many of the participants in this discussion hold views that are considerably more
complex than either of these two positions, I think that stating the
alternatives this way can help illuminate certain aspects of the debate that I want to call into question. Formulating the matter this
way points to a tendency to assume that the relation of religion and
politics is governed by just two variables - religious convictions on
the one hand and recommendations about policy or law on the other.
It further suggests that the question of whether religion should have
a public role in society is identical with the question of whether either the advocacy or the justification of public policies should be
based directly on religious convictions.
I will argue that the debate needs to be framed in a different way.
t This Article recasts and develops ideas presented in several of my previous
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in

CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

(R. Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach, S.J., eds., 1994); David Hollenbach, S.J.,
Fundamental Theology and the Christian Moral Life, in FAITHFUL WITNESS:
FOUNDATIONS OF THEOLOGY FOR TODAY'S CHURCH 167-84 (Leo J. O'Donovan and T.
Howland Sanks eds., 1989); David Hollenbach, S.J., Religion and Political Life, 52
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 87 (1991).
* Margaret O'Brien Flatley Professor of Catholic Theology, Boston College.

Religion is not simply a set of convictions that one should or should

not invoke in political debate. It is a considerably more dynamic and
multidimensional reality than the term "convictions" might suggest.
And political debate is not simply argument about whether to adopt
or reject certain policies. There are, of course, many ways to demarcate the sphere to which the term "political" can be applied. But if
we agree that the political sphere encompasses all human activities
that occur in the public life of society, then it is surely a mistake to
limit it to the policy decisions reached in legislative, executive, or
judicial fora. The res publica is much larger than the sphere of government. It includes all those communities and institutions that form
the rich fabric of civil society. It also includes all those public forms
of discourse, conversation, and argument that constitute a culture.
Therefore, this Article will argue that we need to frame the question of the relation of religion to public life in a way that goes beyond discussion of the direct impact of religious convictions on policy
choices. Religious faiths and traditions have perhaps their most important influence on government, law, and policy-formation in an indirect way. The impact of religion on politics understood as the
sphere of governmental activity is mediated through its influence on
the multiple communities and institutions of civil society and on the
public self-understanding of a society called culture. Parts I and II
of this Article will consider these public influences of religion. Part
III will then address the more specific question of how religious beliefs ought to be related to public policy in light of the discussion of
the first two parts.
I.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MEANING OF "PUBLIC"

One prominent version of the argument for insulating the political
process from the influence of religious convictions harks back to the
dismaying historical record of the Catholic and Protestant communities during the sixteenth and seventeenth century wars of religion.
This history is seen as a precedent for what is likely to happen today
if religious communities decide to press their beliefs as guides for
governmental decision making or public policy. Sometimes this historical appeal is augmented by references to "moral majorities" insisting on prayer in public schools, the teaching of "creation science"
in these schools, and the imposition of religious convictions about
abortion on those who do not share these convictions. Occasionally,
such arguments are reinforced by references to the contemporary Islamic world and to nations where attempts have been made to base
both constitutional and penal law on the Shari'ah. These historical
and contemporary examples lead to considerable fear of what are
seen as the likely results of public, political activity by religious
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communities.
At the root of these fears of a public role for religion is what John
Rawls calls "the fact of pluralism." 1 The regimes of modern democratic societies evolved historically as a way of responding to the diversity of conceptions of the meaning and purpose of life. This
diversity is most evident in religious disagreement. But there is also a
deep pluralism in philosophical conceptions of how to live a good life.
Rawls says that this religious and philosophical pluralism
is not a mere historical condition that will soon pass away; it is, I believe, a
permanent feature of the public culture of modern democracies. Under the
political and social conditions secured by the basic rights and liberties historically associated2 with these regimes, the diversity of views will persist
and may increase.

Under these conditions, the "common sense political sociology of

democratic societies" tells us that agreement on a. single conception
of the good life among all citizens is unattainable. Such agreement
could be maintained "only by the oppressive use of state power." 3
Rawls accurately points to the deep disputes that exist about the
meaning of the good life in our society. But for him there is no way
to resolve these disputes. Therefore he argues that the fact of pluralism demands that in politics we must deal with disagreements about
the comprehensive good of human life by what he calls "the method
of avoidance."4 This method demands that in political life "we try,
so far as we can, neither to assert nor to deny any religious, philosophical or moral views, or their associated philosophical accounts of
truth and the status of values." Avoidance of such basic questions is
necessary in politics, Rawls thinks, if we are to have any chance of
achieving consensus. "We simply apply the principle of toleration to
philosophy itself" when debating the basic political and economic institutions that will structure social life. 6 Each man or woman must
be free to hold his or her view of what the fully good life really is.
But these comprehensive views of the good life must remain the private convictions of individuals. "In applying the principles of toleration to philosophy itself it is left to citizens individually to resolve for
1. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7
1, 4 (1987).
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2. Id.
3. Id.; see also id. at 4 n.7 (giving a sketch of the presuppositions of this "common
sense sociology").
4. Id. at 12.
5. Id. at 12-13.
6. Id. at 13.

themselves the questions of religion, philosophy and morals in accordance with the views they freely affirm."' 7 Or as Richard Rorty puts
it, religious and philosophical convictions should be exempt from coercion in a liberal society under one condition: that such convictions
"be reserved for private life." 8 Argument about the common good is
also to be avoided in debates about more specific public policies. Liberal democracy aims at "disengaging discussions of such questions
from discussions of social policy."" This privatization of "thick" visions of the good is not only a sociologically given fact; it is a moral
constraint on political activity.
This analysis assumes that the presence of religious or comprehensive philosophical views of the good in public life inevitably leads to
conflict. It further presupposes that the public sphere is identical
with the domain governed by the coercive power of the state. From
these presuppositions taken together, it follows that religious influence in public is identified with the coercive enforcement of the religious or philosophical convictions of whatever group is strong enough
to gain control of government. Since this is clearly an unacceptable
outcome, the alternative proposed is the privatization of religion.
I fully agree that the coercive imposition of religious beliefs is
morally unacceptable, as do the vast majority of religious believers
in the West today. The privatization of religion is not, however, the
only alternative to such a coercive outcome if religion appears in
public. Another approach to the question is founded on a more capacious understanding of what public life is, or at least could be. Drawing on my own Roman Catholic tradition, I want to outline such an
approach. Reflection on the role played by a broader vision of the
meaning of public life outside the United States may reinforce its
plausibility.
For liberal thinkers like Rawls, the discussion of the role of religion in public life is framed by certain presuppositions about the institutions that structure social interaction. Their emphasis is on the
state and the market as the principal domains in which social existence unfolds. At the same time, different forms of liberalism embody diverse attitudes of suspicion toward the institutions of
government and the market. Libertarian liberals regard the state as
the principal threat to human freedom and dignity. Consequently
their aim is to keep governmental intervention minimal. Those with

7.
8.

Id. at 15.
Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA

STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN

HISTORY 257, 263 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert Vaughan eds., 1988).
9. Id.
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a more social democratic orientation fear that the market is the principal threat and seek to limit its impact on individuals through governmental regulation and the institutions of the modern welfare
state. In both of these ways of thinking, the paradigm that shapes
analysis envisions individual persons confronting the "megastructures"'10 of either government or the market economy. The relation
of private and public spheres is pictured as the relation of isolated
individuals to large, anonymous, and impersonal institutional structures. Public activities are those conducted within the spheres of government and/or the market. The public sphere thus becomes the
area of human life ruled either by the power of government or by the
constraints of the marketplace. The defense of freedom, therefore, is
viewed as the effort to secure a zone of action that is protected from
governmental power or market determinism. This zone is private. To
use Rawls' terms, it is the domain in which individuals can live "in
accordance with the views they freely affirm."
A number of recent analyses of the contemporary social problematic have raised worrisome questions about the adequacy of this bipolar disjunction of human activity into public and private spheres.
For example, Alan Wolfe's important book, Whose Keeper? Social
Science and Moral Obligation, has argued that the increasingly
dense and interdependent spheres of politics and the marketplace
threaten to overwhelm whatever remnants of private freedom still
exist in advanced modern societies." The sphere of freedom is "increasingly squeezed from two directions" - from the one side by the
bureaucracy of the administrative state and from the other by powerful determinisms of markets linked together in an increasingly
global network.' 2 Wolfe argues that if the freedom promised by modernity is to survive under the conditions that prevail in advanced
societies in the late twentieth century, we need a counterweight to
this pressure from the state and the market. Solitary, private individuals cannot provide this counterweight. "We need civil society families, communities, friendship networks, solidaristic workplace

10. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE
OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1977) (using the term megastructures

to refer primarily to the large bureaucracies of government).
1I. ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
(1989).
12. Id.

MORAL OBLIGATION 20

ties, voluntarism, spontaneous groups and movements - not to reject, but to complete the project of modernity."13 He further maintains that the bonds of solidarity associated with closer and more
intimate relations in the realm regarded as private by liberal theory
"requires that we extend the 'inward' moral rules of civil society
'outward' to the realm of nonintimate and distant social relations. 14
Wolfe does not mean to suggest that the moral framework that
guides political or economic life can be based directly on the values
of family life, the bonds of close friendships, or the solidarity of
groups that share common religious or philosophical convictions. But
he does argue that the bonds of community need to be given much
greater public space than the sharp split of the political from the
private advocated by Rawls and Rorty. The strong communal links
found in the diverse groups of civil society must have greater public
presence. Otherwise individuals will experience further diminishment
of their freedom and power in the face of the growing complexity of
distant governmental and economic megastructures. The image of
human life as divided between a public sector of governments and
markets and a private sector of individual autonomous freedom is
unrealistic. Freedom will not flourish or perhaps even survive unless
it enjoys greater presence and support in public. We need a more
complex and differentiated picture of the world in which we really
live.
This is not the place to rehearse the sociological arguments on
which Wolfe bases his conclusions. For the purposes of this Article, I
will presume that Wolfe's analysis has revealed a significant problem
in the prevailing conception of the relation of the public and private
realms, and ask readers to assess my argument about the role of
religion in political life in light of this presupposition.
To be even clearer about presuppositions, it will be obvious why
Wolfe's analysis is congenial to one who, like myself, has been
shaped by the tradition of Roman Catholic social thought. Especially
since the birth of modernity, the Roman Catholic tradition has been
suspicious both of social theories extolling the primacy of the state
and of theories granting primacy to the market. At the same time,
this tradition has rejected individualistic understandings of freedom.
In fact, its rejection of an individualistic understanding of the self is
the source of its suspicion of both liberal contract theories of politics
and laissez-faire models of economic life. Its view of the public-private relationship is not bipolar, with the megastructures of the state
or the market defining the public sphere and the autonomous freedom of the individual defining the private sphere. Rather it proposes
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
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a model of social life that is richer and institutionally more pluralistic than that of standard liberal theory.
Modern Catholic teaching, to be sure, is strongly concerned about
the fate of individuals. For example, Pope John XXIII stated that
"[t]he cardinal point of this teaching [of the Catholic church] is that
individual men are necessarily the foundation, cause, and end of all
social institutions."15 But the Pope immediately added: "We are referring to human beings, insofar as they are social by nature." 16
Human dignity and worth is never achieved in solitude, nor is the
protection of this dignity simply a matter of insulating individuals
from the costs (and denying them the opportunities) that attend interaction with others. Rather, the task of protecting human dignity
and freedom is a task of protecting the quality of the relationships
among persons in such a way that freedom and dignity can be realized. In this sense, there is no strictly private sphere. Because
humans are relational beings whose identity, worth, and dignity is
attained in interaction with others, human flourishing is always public or social. Thus Catholic social thought emphasizes the multiple
forms of human relationship and community in which persons are
formed and nurtured. Social space is not occupied only by the large
institutions of government and market on the one hand and individuals on the other. This is evident in the tradition's stress on the importance of securing the well-being of "intermediary" institutions such
as families and voluntary associations, and it is a key to understanding how we can envision a form of political life that is communal
without being statist. It also suggests a way of envisioning the public
role of religion that avoids the charge that whenever religion becomes public, religious coercioir will be the result.
The distinction between the public sphere and the domain of governmental power was central to the discussion of the relation of the
Catholic church to democracy that took place in the middle decades
of this century and that bore fruit at the Second Vatican Council. In
the 1950s, Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray argued for
the compatibility of a public role for religion with the institutions of
democracy by reaffirming the distinction between society and the
state. Society is composed of a rich and overlapping set of human
communities such as families, neighborhoods, churches, labor unions,
15.

Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, in THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE:
143, 190 219 (Joseph Gremillion ed.,

CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING SINCE POPE JOHN

1976).

16. Id.

corporations, professional associations, credit unions, cooperatives,
universities, and a host of other associations. These communities are
not private but public. Especially when they are small or of intermediate size, they enable persons to come together in ways that can be
vividly experienced. The bonds of communal solidarity formed in
them enable persons to act together, empowering them to shape
some of the contours of public life and its larger social institutions
such as the state and the economy. In a democratic society, government does not rule but rather serves the social "body" animated by
the activity of these intermediate communities. Pope Pius XI formulated the matter in what came to be known as the principle of subsidiarity: government "ought of its very nature to furnish help
[subsidium] to the members of the body social, and never destroy
and absorb them."'11 Or in Maritain's words, "[t]he State is inferior
to the body politic as a whole, and is at the service of the body politic as a whole."-" The body politic or civil society is the primary
locus in which human solidarity is realized.
In the writings of Maritain and Murray, the society-state distinction is at the root of their affirmation both of religious freedom and
of constitutional democracy. It is the basis for their firm opposition
to all forms of totalitarianism, state absolutism, or religious coercion.
The writ of government does not reach as far as the full scope of the
public life of society. The defense of the free exercise of religion and
the defense of the existence and freedom of the communities that
make up civil society are directly linked to each other. Thus the
right to religious freedom and the rights to public association and
public expression are inseparable. As Murray concluded,
[T]he personal or corporate free exercise of religion, as a human and civil
right, is evidently cognate with other more general human and civil rights
- with the freedom of corporate bodies and institutions within society,
based on the principle of subsidiary function; with the general freedom of
association for peaceful purposes, based on the social nature of man; with
the general 19
freedom of speech and of the press, based on the nature of political society.

This argument reveals one way that a Catholic understanding of
the institutions of democracy and the human rights that undergird
them presents a challenge to those forms of liberalism concerned exclusively or primarily with the defense of the freedom of individuals
to act as they please in a zone of privacy. The presupposition about
the basis of democracy is not the sovereign autonomy of the individual. Participation in public life and the exercise of freedom in society
17. Pope Pius XI, QuadragesimoAnno 1 79 (National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D.C., 1942).
18. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 13 (1951).
19. JOHN C. MURRAY, THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 26-27 (1965).
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depend on the strength of the communal institutions that give persons a measure of real power to shape their environment, including
their political environment. As John Coleman has argued, this kind
of commitment to democracy rests on "a presumptive rule about
where real vitality exists in society" - in the diverse and overlapping communities that make up civil society.20 The public and the
social, therefore, are not to be identified with the sphere of government. Social practices and institutions can be truly public even
though not under governmental control. Thus churches, just like all
the other associations that make up civil society, must be both free
from domination by the state and free to act and express themselves
in public.
The importance of civil society as a public sphere that is not dominated by the state was powerfully illustrated by the way the recent
collapse of communism was so rapidly brought about in Central and
Eastern Europe. The power of the dissident workers and intellectuals
of the "velvet revolutions" of 1989 grew out of their success in creating the solidarity of a genuine civil society, not out of direct seizure
of state power or out of the barrel of a gun. What were initially
extragovernmental bonds of community at Gdansk's shipyards and
Prague's Magic Lantern Theater empowered men and women to effect a stunning transformation of supposedly untransformable totalitarian regimes. In the words of Bronislaw Geremek, Speaker of the
Parliament in Poland, the emergence of civil society out from under
the dominant apparatus of the state became possible when
Dissidents engaged in their own peculiar type of mental resistance, which
typically began with a refusal to participate in falsehood, grew into a desire
to bear loud witness to one's own views and conscience, and then finally
drove one to political action ....

The idea of civil society -

even one that

avoids overtly political activities in favor of education, the exchange of ininterests of particular
formation and opinion, or the protection of the basic
groups - has enormous antitotalitarian potential."1

The public role of religion in the revolutions of 1989 varied from
one country to another, and the churches were surely not the sole
agents of this transformation.22 But there is no question that the
commitment of the churches was crucial in sustaining the many
overlapping communities that make up civil society - communities
20.

JOHN

A.

COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY

226 (1982).

21. Bronislaw Geremek, Civil Society and the Present Age, in THE
SocIETY 11, 11-12 (1992).
22.

(1991).
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that refused to submit to state domination. Adam Michnik, a Jewish
intellectual and Solidarity activist, described the Catholic church's
role in Poland this way several years before the revolution occurred:
The
faced byasPolish
society
is that civil
society
doesn'titsexist.
Society isproblem
not recognized
capable
of organizing
itself
to defend
particular
that
interests
pointsis of
everyand
viewproperty.
....
[TIhe
present totalitarian system insists
person
State
The Church's
view is that every person
is a child of God, to whom God has granted natural liberty . . . It follows

fromantidote
this thattointhe
ral
Poland
and other
communist
totalitarian
countries
claims
religion2 3is the natuof the State
authorities.

In East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, as well as in Poland,
the recovery of freedom, the revival of civil society, and the public
presence of the churches (Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant) were
closely connected phenomena.
These recent events in Central and Eastern Europe may seem irrelevant to an effort to clarify the proper public role for religion in
the United States. There is an analogy, however, between the destruction of civil society under Communist rule in the Eastern bloc
and the weakening of civil society in the West that Alan Wolfe fears
is occurring. To be sure, if the alternatives to present patterns of
American society are communist totalitarianism, the authoritarian
oligopolies that have been dominant in much of Latin American history, or the one-party states common in Africa, there can be no
doubt of the superiority of the democratic institutions of the North
Atlantic. But the choice we face in the politics of the United States
today is not one between democracy and authoritarianism. Rather it
is at least a plausible hypothesis that here the more immediate
threat to a civil society capable of nurturing freedom is not an authoritarian state, but the dominance of the market and the market's
instrumental rationality over increasingly large domains of social
and cultural life.
If this hypothesis is correct, the liberal instinct to treat all activities that are not directly governmental as private is not only sociologically inaccurate but politically dangerous. Among the many
"nongovernmental organizations" that have a crucial role to play in
sustaining the vision of public life that is crucial to democracy are
the churches. This is so for two reasons.
First, the assertion of the right to religious freedom was a key
factor in the movement that brought about modern constitutional democracy. This right was not only "cognate" with the full range of
the human rights of a democratic society, as John Courtney Murray
maintained in the passage cited above. It was one of the principal
causal forces, socially embodied in religious communities, that led to
23.

Erica Blair, Towards a Civil Society: Hopesfor Polish Democracy, TIMEs
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the rise of modern democracy. For this reason, the freedom of the
many diverse communities of solidarity in civil society and the freedom of the churches rise or fall together. An effort to privatize religion, whether in practice or in theory, therefore, is "cognate" with
an effort to privatize every human activity that is not properly part
of the exercise of state power. A successful move in this direction
will leave the individual human being alone and defenseless in the
face of the encroaching power of the market. It will also leave the
individual unable to form those bonds of solidarity that are essential
if government is to be made to function in a way that keeps the
market in its place. An active, public role for religion, therefore,
would seem to be one of the preconditions of a vibrant democratic
life.
Second, the churches possess unique resources that can contribute
to the strengthening of other communities of solidarity in civil society. Ideas about love of neighbor - about commitment to the well
being of other persons - are present in all religious traditions. The
meaning of this love and commitment, of course, is interpreted in
different ways in different religious traditions. But all these traditions possess resources that can serve as an antidote to the idea that
a democratic society can be successfully constructed on self-interest
or, as Rawls would have it, mutual disinterest. More than this is
needed if any public realm is to thrive or even survive in the face of
market pressures and the logic of instrumental market-rationality.
Further, sociologist Robert Wuthnow's empirical survey-research
has shown that people's spiritual concerns translate into active efforts to respond to the needs of their neighbors only when these concerns are lived out in the context of a publicly visible and active
religious community. Wuthnow's data suggest that understanding religion or spirituality as a purely private affair between an individual
and his or her god, without the mediation of a religious community
with a public presence in society, has little effect on believers' responses to their neighbors:
I interpret these results to mean that religious inclinations make very little
difference unless one becomes involved in some kind of organized religious

community. Once you are involved in such a community, then a higher level
of piety may be associated with putting yourself out to help the needy. But
if you are not involved in some kind of religious organization, then a higher
level of piety seems
24 unlikely to generate charitable efforts toward the poor
or disadvantaged.

24. ROBERT WUTHNOW, ACTS OF COMPASSION: CARING FOR OTHERS AND HELPING OURSELVES 156 (1991).

The increasing privatization of religion as not only separated from
the sphere of government but as a purely personal affair independent
of any organized religious community thus seems to threaten to undermine any positive effects religion can have in society. Wuthnow
concludes that "[i]f religious values have been an inducement for
people to .care for their neighbors historically, then the spread of individualism within modern religion is likely to have a dampening effect on charitable behavior. "25
Wuthnow's conclusion on the link between religious convictions
and charitable behavior is echoed in the preliminary findings of a
study of political activism in the United States being conducted by
my colleague Kay Schlozman in cooperation with Sidney Verba,
Henry Brady,. and Norman Nie. One of the conclusions of this study
is that participation in church activities appears to sow seeds of political activism. "Churches are 'incubators' for tomorrow's political
activists."26 Engagement in church-related activity teaches organizational skills that are readily transferable to politics. In addition, the
study has found that "contrary to political scientists' assumptions,
personal gain played a minimal role in causing people to become active. The responses [of those surveyed in the study] indicate that
psychological rewards, such as commitment to community and 'doing one's civic duty,' are primary motivators. 27 This suggests that
an active presence of religious communities in the public life of the
country can strengthen rather than threaten democracy. If one fears
that public life is becoming increasingly fragile, the prescription
would appear to be more church involvement in public life, not less.
II.

CULTURE, PUBLIC DISCOURSE, AND THE COMMON GOOD

Such a proposal for strengthening the bonds of communal solidarity in society, of course, can be expected to be greeted with suspicion
by those who fear that it will lead to coerced cohesion. This is particularly so when the proposal includes the suggestion that religious
communities should play a more public role in shaping the bonds
that link persons together in public. There is apprehension that this
will lead churches to act simply as special interest groups, seeking
power to press their own agendas through the political process. Thus
the position being advocated here must respond to the legitimate
question of whether any strong vision of solidarity can be pursued
beyond the boundaries of small and intermediate sized communities
25. Id.
26. See the report on these preliminary findings in John Ombletts, Activists Get
Their Training at Church, B.C. BIWEEKLY, Mar. 26, 1992, at 5.
27. Id.
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without sacrificing intellectual freedom and social pluralism. Thinkers like Rawls are very skeptical that this is possible. Because he
thinks the effort to achieve some consensus about the common good
of the larger society is necessarily futile, he concludes that we will
have to get along with a politics that is neutral on competing conceptions of the good life. Thus all talk about the "comprehensive"
human good should be restricted to the private sphere.
The experience of history shows that these fears are not products
of fantasy. Societies characterized by strong bonds of solidarity have
sometimes been oppressive of freedom. Religious groups have sometimes used state power to stifle pluralism. And it will surely be difficult to find an alternative to the commitment to neutrality about the
meaning of the human good in a nation and a world where awareness of diversity is growing.
Nevertheless, if the argument of the previous part of this Article is
correct, paying exclusive attention to the dangers of closed communities and the difficulty of establishing dialogue among the subgroups
in a pluralistic society also poses a serious threat to the quality of
social life. We would do better, as Robin Lovin has suggested, to try
to develop an understanding of the relationship of religion and politics "in terms that fit the discourse to which we aspire, rather than
the distortions that we fear." 28
Lovin points out that theories which support efforts to insulate the
political domain from any religious influence are "curiously abstract" and do not describe well the role religious beliefs actually
play in the lives of many people. 9 In fact, people's conceptions of
how life ought to be lived -

including religious conceptions -

are

routinely introduced into public discourse. Even those who profess to
support public neutrality on the meaning of the good life find it difficult to live up to their ideal in practice. The interconnection of our
lives and the common institutions we share make the demand that
we be silent on the deeper issues of how we should live together itself
seem like a form of repression. Is it really possible to maintain that
fundamental convictions about the meaning of the good life can be
regarded as private preferences rather than matters of high public
importance in a society like ours? At a historical moment when persons are increasingly interdependent on each other and in which
their fates are so obviously worked out in a natural environment they
28. Robin W. Lovin, Perry, Naturalism, and Religion in Public, 63 TUL. L. REV.
1517, 1539 (1989).
29. Id. at 1518-19.

share in common, a negative answer to this question seems almost
obvious.
We also need to question whether the method proposed for securing justice in public life by those who argue for political neutrality
on the full human good can actually succeed. According to Rawls
and others who follow his lead, we can publicly debate about the
means that will satisfy the maximum number of private preferences
about the good. But they maintain that the terms of this debate must
be set by "public reason." This is defined as "the shared methods of,
and the public knowledge available to, common sense, and the proce30
dures and conclusions of science when these are not controversial.
Rawls adopts this criterion for public morality because he thinks
that no other standards of judgment are available in the face of contemporary philosophical and religious pluralism. Rorty goes further.
For Rorty, the exclusion of religious and philosophical understandings of the good life from the public domain is desirable in itself, not
just a necessary consequence of the fact of pluralism. It"helps along
the disenchantment of the world. It helps make the world's inhabitants more pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal, more receptive to
the appeal of instrumental rationality." 31
Common sense, uncontroversial science, and instrumental rationality are very shaky foundations for the civic unity of the nation. In
fact, there is considerable evidence that the lack of more substantive
discourse about the common good is a source of the alienation of
many citizens from participation in political activity today. In an insightful book titled Why Americans Hate Politics, E. J. Dionne argues that this alienation can be attributed to the fact that current
political discourse fails to address the real needs of communities.
This failure is itself partly the result of the fact that interest-group
politics is frequently incapable of even naming the social bonds that
increasingly destine us to sharing either a common good or a "common bad."32 Politics is perceived as a contest among interest groups
with little or no concern for the wider society and its problems. Thus
the "common sense" that shapes American public life today becomes
increasingly governed by a cynical "I'll get mine" attitude. Neutrality about the good on the level of theory in this way becomes a selffulfilling prophesy on the level of practice. A principled commitment
to avoiding sustained discourse about the human good produces a
downward spiral in which shared meaning, understanding, and community become even harder to achieve. It can lead to a politics that
is little more than a quasi-market in preferences and power.
30.
31.

Rawls, supra note 1, at 8.
Rorty, supra note 8, at 271.

32.

E. J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS (1991).
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Are there alternatives to political neutrality about the meaning of
the good life that could generate greater social solidarity without stifling freedom and suppressing pluralism? A closer look at the historical record shows that memories of the role religion has played in
generating political conflict and even violence, though accurate, are
not the whole story. Other memories suggest ways of responding to
Lovin's call to develop our thinking in ways that fit the discourse to
which we aspire rather than the distortions we fear.
For example, the Catholic tradition provides some noteworthy evidence that discourse across the boundaries of diverse communities is
both possible and potentially fruitful when it is pursued seriously.
This tradition, in its better moments, has experienced considerable
success in efforts to bridge the divisions that have separated it from
other communities with other understandings of the good life. In the
first and second centuries, the early Christian community moved
from being a small Palestinian sect to active encounter with the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. In the fourth century, Augustine brought
biblical faith into dialogue with Stoic and Neoplatonic thought. His
efforts profoundly transformed both Christian and Graeco-Roman
thought and practice. In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas
once again transformed Western Christianity by appropriating ideas
from Aristotle that he had learned from Arab Muslims and from
Jews. In the process he also transformed Aristotelian ways of thinking in fundamental ways. Not the least important of these transformations was his insistence that the political life of a people is not the
highest realization of the good of which they are capable - an insight that lies at the root of constitutional theories of limited government.3 3 And though the Church resisted the liberal discovery of
modern freedoms through much of the modern period, liberalism has
been transforming Catholicism once again through the last half of
our own century. The memory of these events in social and intellectual history as well as the experience of the Catholic Church since
the Second Vatican Council leads me to hope that communities
holding different visions of the good life can get somewhere if they
are willing to risk conversation and argument about these visions.
Injecting such hope back into the public life of the United States
would be a signal achievement. Today, it appears to be not only desirable but necessary.
33. For documentation and analysis of the medieval roots of constitutionalism and
theories of limited government, see BRIAN TIERNEY. THE CRISIS OF CHURCH & STATE
1050-1300 (1964).

The spirit that is required for such discourse about the public good
might be called intellectual solidarity - a willingness to take other
persons seriously enough to engage them in conversation and debate
about what they think makes life worth living, including what they
think will make for the good of the polis. Such a spirit is partially
the same but entirely different from an appeal to tolerance as the
appropriate response to pluralism. Tolerance is a strategy of noninterference with the beliefs and life-styles of those who are different.
It leads to what Rawls calls the "method of avoidance" as the appropriate way to deal with persons or traditions that are "other." The
spirit of intellectual solidarity is similar to tolerance in that it recognizes and respects these differences. It does not seek to eliminate
pluralism through coercion. But it differs radically from pure tolerance by seeking not avoidance but positive engagement with the
other through both listening and speaking. It is rooted in a hope that
understanding might replace incomprehension and that perhaps even
agreement could result. And since it seeks an exchange that is a mutual listening and speaking, it can only develop in an atmosphere of
genuine freedom. Also, because this exchange is mutual, the freedom
in which it takes place is not the private freedom of an atomistic self.
Where such conversation about the good life begins and develops, a
community of freedom begins to exist. And this is itself a major part
of the common good. Indeed it is this freedom in reciprocal dialogue
that is one of the characteristics that distinguishes a community of
solidarity from one marked by domination and repression.
What might such public discourse look like? First, it will concern
visions of those human goods that are neither strictly political nor
strictly economic. Broadly speaking, this is conversation and argument about the shape of the culture the participants either share
because of their common traditions or could share in the future
through the understanding of each other they seek to achieve. The
forum for such discussion is not, in the first instance, the legislative
chamber or the court of law. It is the university and all the other
venues where thoughtful men and women undertake the tasks of retrieving, criticizing, and reconstructing understandings of the human
good from the historical past and transmitting them to the future
through education. It occurs as well wherever people bring their received historical traditions on the meaning of the good life into intelligent and critical encounter with understandings of this good held
by other peoples with other traditions. It occurs, in short, wherever
education about and serious inquiry into the meaning of the good life
4
takes place.3
34. The similarity of this cultural endeavor with what Michael Perry calls "ecumenical politics" is evident. See MICHAEL J. PERRY. LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF
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This education and inquiry is at the heart of intellectual solidarity
and the public life of society, and its presence (or absence) will have
crucial political implications. As John Courtney Murray once noted,
"[t]he great 'affair' of the commonwealth is, of course, education." 5
He was referring to education in the broadest sense: the organization
of schools and their curricula, but even more to the level of critical
cultural self-understanding among both the populace at large and
among its elites. In both theory and practice today, this entire cultural and educational project of understanding, criticizing, and reconstructing visions of what it is to be authentically human (Rawls'
"comprehensive understandings of the good") is often treated as a
private affair. Murray's insistence that this project is not only an
affair but the great affair of the commonwealth challenges this presupposition frontally. To the extent that moral and political theories
seek to exclude the task of education and inquiry from the public
forum by privatizing all full visions of the human good, they undermine the very foundations of public life.
David Tracy fears that this process of undermining is already far
advanced. He has argued that the privatization of these cultural concerns threatens so to instrumentalize and technicize public life as to
destroy it altogether.3 6 In much contemporary liberal thought, both
theoretical and popular, tolerance of diversity has become the premier cultural lesson to be learned. But if a community that prizes
both solidarity and freedom is to be realized, engagement with the
other, and not just tolerance, is required. In such engagement, a person's own deeper convictions are set forward as potential contributions to public understanding and simultaneously placed at risk of
revision.
(1991). I am not fully clear, however,
about the degree to which Perry sees this dialogue about the good life (what he calls "the
question of the truly, fully human") as occurring principally in the sphere of politics
conceived as the domain of government and law, or whether he has a broader understanding of politics in mind, i.e., the political as all that occurs in the public life of
society. If the latter, his understanding of ecumenical politics is very similar to what I am
here calling cultural conversation and argument. There is also a similarity between what
I am proposing and Alasdair Maclntyre's understanding of a "tradition of enquiry,"
though Maclntyre is virtually silent about how this understanding is related to the domain of government, law, and the political sphere narrowly conceived. See ALASDAIR C.
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 349-403 (1988).
RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS

35. JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 9 (1960).

36.

See David Tracy, Catholic Classics in American Liberal Culture, in CATHOLI-

CISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach eds., 1994).

196-213 (R.

Seen in this light, it is no accident that the arts, the theater, and
philosophy played a central role in breaking the grip of totalitarianism in Czechoslovakia.3 7 Though the task of sustaining and strengthening public life in the United States today is without doubt very
different than in Central Europe, the importance of genuinely public
conversation and argument about what forms of human living are
truly good is equally important here. As will be discussed below,
such discussion occurs partly in our discourse about the institutions
of political and economic life and also in discussion of more particular policies in both spheres. The quality of these political and economic debates, however, will be dependent on the depth of the larger
cultural exchange. The achievement of solidarity in the political and
economic domains is dependent on the strengthening of free discourse in the cultural sphere - intellectual solidarity in a cultural
community of freedom.
Second, the possibility and necessity of such a truly free cultural
exchange has direct implications for the role of religion in public life.
We must begin to entertain the possibility of conversation about the
visions of the human good held by diverse religious communities and
of intellectual engagement with them. Such a suggestion will be beyond the pale if one views all religious convictions as a rigid set of
beliefs held on nonrational grounds. In this view, religion is very
likely to be a source of division, conflict, and even violence when it
appears in public. It is inherently uncivil.
The Catholic tradition and many Protestant traditions as well,
however, reject the notion that religious faith must be irrational and,
therefore, uncivil. Faith and understanding go hand in hand in both
the Catholic and Calvinist views of the matter. They are not adversarial but reciprocally illuminating. As Tracy puts it, Catholic social
thought seeks to correlate arguments drawn from the distinctive religious symbols of Christianity with arguments based on shared public
experience.3 8 This effort at correlation moves back and forth on a
two-way street. It rests on a conviction that the classical symbols and
doctrines of Christianity can uncover meaning in personal and social
existence that common sense and uncontroversial science fail to see.
So it invites those outside the church to place their self-understanding at risk by what Tracy calls conversation with such "classics." At
the same time, the believer's self-understanding is also placed at risk
37.

See VACLAV HAVEL, DISTURBING THE PEACE: A CONVERSATION WITH KAREL
(Paul Wilson trans., 1990). Rorty has taken a dim view of the role of philosophy in the Czechoslovakian revolution, or at least of the idea that Havel and other Charter '77 leaders could take "metaphysical" claims for the basis of public morality at face
value. See Rorty's review of several books by Jan Patoka, the philosopher who was the
symbolic leader of Charter '77, Richard Rorty, The Seer of Prague, NEw REPUBLIC,
July 1, 1991, at 35-40.
38. See Tracy, supra note 36.
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because it can be challenged to development or even fundamental
change by dialogue with the other - whether this be a secular agnostic, a Christian from another tradition, or a Jew, Muslim, or
Buddhist.
Intellectual solidarity has religious implications. It means that in a
community of freedom, religion should be represented in the discourse about the goods of public life. It equally means that religious
believers must enter this discourse prepared to listen as well as to
speak, to learn from what they hear, and, if necessary, to change as
a result of what they have learned. The experience of the Catholic
Church over the last half century has been a vivid example of such
listening, learning, and changing through its encounter with liberalism. This process must and will continue as Catholics develop their
self-understanding into the future. Is it too much to expect that the
experience of transformation through engagement rather than tolerance could strengthen America's public philosophy in an analogous

way?3"
Serious dialogue is risky business. At least some religious believers
have been willing to take this risk. The future of public life in our
society could be considerably enhanced by the willingness of a considerably larger number of people to take this risk of cultural dialogue, whether they begin as fundamentalists convinced of their
certitudes or agnostics convinced of their doubts. Our society needs
more imagination about how to deal creatively with the problems it
faces than instrumental rationality can provide. In Martha Nussbaum's words, a vision of the full human good arises from
[M]yths and stories from many times and places, stories explaining to both
friends and strangers what it is to be human rather than something else.
The account is the outcome of a process of self-interpretation and self-clariuse of the story-telling imagination far more than the
fication that makes
scientific intellect.40

Religious traditions and communities are among the principal

bearers of these imaginative sources for our understanding of the
human good. They can evoke not only private self-understanding but

public vision as well. Both believers and unbelievers alike have reason to risk considering what contribution religious traditions might
make to our understanding of the public good. For a society to try to
39. See PERRY, supra note 34; see also Lovin, supra note 28, at 1517-39. Both
Perry's earlier work and Lovin's theological reflection on it are discussed in my Religion
and PoliticalLife, 52 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 87 (1991).
40. Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE
GOOD 203, 217 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990).

exclude religious narratives and symbols from public life simply because they are identified with religion would be to impoverish itself
intellectually and culturally. This would deprive society of one of its
most important resources for a more publicly shared cultural selfunderstanding. Religious communities make perhaps their most important contribution to public life through this contribution to the
formation of culture. If they seek to make this contribution through
a dialogue of mutual listening and speaking with others, it will be
fully congruent with the life of a free society.
III.

RELIGION AND PUBLIC POLICY, MORE NARROWLY
CONSIDERED

These perspectives on the role of religion in sustaining civil society
and forming culture provide a context for considering the more
pointed question of the relation of religious belief to the political
sphere more narrowly conceived. What role ought belief to play in
the decisions of those who draft legislation, reach judicial decisions,
administer the domestic and foreign affairs of the nation, or exercise
the responsibilities of citizenship (minimally through the vote)? This
is the question that has been central in the recent debate about the
political role of religion among legal scholars and political philosophers, and it is an important and entirely legitimate one. But the
perspectives outlined in this Article may shed some new light on how
to go about addressing this issue.
The presupposition of those who would place stringent limits on
appealing to religious belief in the formulation of law and public policy is that there is a sharp discontinuity between a community of
religious believers and the larger body of public society. They see a
similar discontinuity between religious reasons for particular policy
choices and publicly accessible reasons for such choices. In Kent
Greenawalt's analysis, religious belief is not accessible to public reason because it is deeply rooted in the personal experience of the believer. It is the experience of the believer that confirms religious
truth for him or her. Thus other persons who do not share the same
experiences have no way to assess the truth of the beliefs involved.
Because there is "no interpersonal way in which the weight of personal experience is to be assessed," there is no interpersonal way to
assess the truth of the religious beliefs grounded in such experience. 41 Though Greenawalt rejects the idea that religion is a purely
private or idiosyncratic affair, the presence of subjective experience
in religious belief means that, in the end, its truth cannot be publicly
assessed. This Article has argued that these presuppositions ought to
41. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further
Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1019, 1031 (1990).
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be questioned. Though religious belief is doubtless confirmed and
supported by personal experience, so is the insight into the beauty of
a great work of literature, music, or sculpture. In the domain of the
aesthetic, judgments of value are not publicly assessable by the criteria of common sense and uncontroversial science, but that does not
make them purely subjective. We can and do make judgments about
the relative merits of novels, poems, and paintings. The loss of the
ability to make such judgments in a particular society is a sign of
decadence and decline in its culture. Religious understandings of the
human good play an important role in shaping the culture of civil
society. To regard religious convictions as beyond the reach of any
public assessment is to deny the possibility of the kind of dialogue
within a pluralistic society advocated here. -Similarly, religious communities are constituent parts of civil society, and efforts to confine
their activities to a zone of privacy will weaken civil society in dangerous ways.
The framework for considering the place of religious belief in the
formulation of public policy thus shifts from a discussion of the role
of private communities and convictions in the shaping of political life
to a discussion of the proper role of the many public communities of
civil society and the diverse public traditions within a culture in
reaching decisions about policy in a pluralistic society. Framed this
way, the proper role of religious convictions in the advocacy of particular political choices is the same as the role of convictions that are
not religious. Persons or groups should not face political disability or
disenfranchisement simply because their political views are rooted in
religious traditions and beliefs.
At the same time, it has been argued here that it would be a serious mistake for religious communities to operate in public simply as
interest groups seeking to enforce their views through state power.
How is it possible to affirm that religious communities can legitimately operate in the political sphere just like nonreligious communities do, and yet to reject the idea that they can rightly function
like interest groups playing the game of majoritarian politics? The
answer to this question depends on clarifying the manner in which
believers or churches move from their faith convictions to their conclusions about policy.
The issue of how churches should make this move is itself partly a
religious and theological one. Certain religious traditions hold that
the Bible, other normative scriptures, or some form of church authority can provide direct guidance for decisions about public policy.

In this view, for at least some areas of public life, conclusions about
public policy or law are directly entailed by religious convictions
with no intermediary steps in the argument. For example, some conservative evangelical or fundamentalist Christians draw policy conclusions about the rights of homosexuals or about prayer in public
schools directly from the Bible, while Mennonites conclude that a
pacifist rejection of all war is an immediate consequence of the
teachings of Jesus. Some more conservative Catholics regard the legal banning of abortion as similarly entailed by the moral teachings
of the pope and the Catholic bishops. From what has been said
above about the need for believers to enter into dialogue with others
in society as they develop their vision of the larger meaning of the
social good and its consequences for policy, it is evident that I do not
accept this understanding of the relation between religious belief and
policy conclusions as immediate and direct. Roman Catholic
thought, like much of Protestant thought as well, maintains that religious belief must be complemented by the careful use of human reasoning, both philosophical and social scientific, in the effort to reach
decisions about policy that are both religiously and humanly adequate. In Tracy's terms, when Christians advocate public policies,
convictions rooted in the Bible and Christian tradition must be
brought into mutually critical correlation with understandings based
on human experience and reasoned reflection on this experience.
Such a stance reflects a religious and theological perspective that
views faith and reason as complementary to each other, not as opposed or fundamentally bifurcated from each other.
This theological stance is not shared by all Christians. For example, some Christians hold that human reason is so corrupted by the
fall that it is an unreliable guide for both religion and morality, and
that culture is so distorted by sin that it should be simply opposed,
not regarded as a dialogue partner. Therefore it can be asked
whether the dialogic framework for the relation of religious convictions and public policy is really compatible with full participation by
all religious groups in the shaping of public life. David Smolin has
raised such an objection to Michael Perry's argument that religious
convictions are properly admitted to the debate about policy if these
convictions are open to revision through dialogue with those who do
not share them, but that convictions that are taken as fixed and irreformable should be excluded from this debate. Smolin concludes
that "Perry has used his own vision of good religion as the standard
for admission to political and legal debate. ' ' 42 Perry's standard excludes "theologically conservative theists, including various Protestant Christians (evangelicals, fundamentalists, and pentecostals) and
42.

David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious

and Cultural Conflict in a
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traditionalists (Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and Lutherans). Those
excluded, moreover, include the religious groups most active in try-

ing to displace the cultural hegemony of America's highly secularized elites. '43
In his contribution to this Symposium, Perry has acknowledged
the force of Smolin's complaint. He now agrees that his former argument for the inclusion of some religious convictions in the public debate and for the exclusion of others rests on theological/
epistemological views that are widely contested in American society.
Perry's most recent position is that because these views are contested, they ought not to be excluded from the actual public debate
where this contest takes place. He proposes that his disagreement
with conservative Protestants and traditionalist Catholics ought to be
part of the public debate, not excluded from it. He would conduct
this argument in public on properly religious and theological
grounds, not exclude it from the public sphere. In an ironic way,
Perry now wants to admit all religious-moral convictions to the public square for the same reason that Rawls and others want to exclude
them: because they are controverted. Perry thus proposes that engagement with religious and philosophical difference be carried to its
full conclusion - public debate should include debate that is properly theological. Perry would argue with Smolin, and in this argument try to show that Smolin's views rest on bad theology and bad
epistemology.
[I]t is one thing to say to a David Smolin, "Although your arguments, no
less than mine, may serve as a (sole) basis for political choice, this is why I
reject your arguments and think others should too." It is another thing to
say, "I don't even have to try to meet your arguments on the merits, 4be4
cause, unlike mine, they may not serve as a basis for political choice."'

I am in fundamental agreement with the thrust of Perry's response
to Smolin's critique. There should be no religious tests for entry into
public debate in a democratic society. But it can be questioned
whether the real differences between Perry and Smolin, which are
religious and theological, are best dealt with in arguments about
quite precise issues that are up for decision in the spheres of law and
public policy. As Kent Greenawalt has observed, there is reason for
Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1076-77
(1991).
43. Id. at 1077-78.
44. Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further
Thoughts-And Second Thoughts-On Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703,
717-18 (1993).

skepticism about "the promise of religious perspectives being transformed in what is primarily political debate."45 For example, I do
not think it would be helpful for two judges, one a liberal Catholic
and the other a conservative Protestant, to launch into epistemological and theological reasoning to explain why their responses to a
piece of legislation regarding abortion are different. These theological and epistemological differences are better dealt with in the discussions that take place in the sphere I have called cultural, not that
of the political sphere conceived narrowly as the judiciary or legislature. This cultural domain is fully public, and participation in it
should be open to all comers. The work of the legislature and the
courts, however, depends on the preexistence of some consensus in
civil society and culture, and lawmakers must rely on this consensus
if their activity is to be in any sense democratic. For the legislature
or the courts to undertake the settlement of controverted religious or
philosophical differences would border dangerously close to a form of
political absolutism, even totalitarianism.
The arguments that Perry wants to have with Smolin about theology and religious epistemology should be vigorous and public. Similarly, serious contributions by the churches to public conversation
and argument about our cultural understanding of the meaning of
human life should be encouraged, not discouraged. It will be precisely through the development and refinement of such understanding in our culture that a stronger consensus about the goods to be
pursued in politics will be generated. To the extent that this larger
cultural dialogue is in some measure successful, the reasons offered
by believers for their more specific decisions about policy will become more publicly accessible in society at large.
Although the domains of government and policy-formation are not
generally the appropriate ones in which to argue controverted theological and philosophical issues, it is nevertheless neither possible nor
desirable to construct an airtight barrier between politics and culture. In general, public policy should reflect the cultural consensus
about the social good that is present among the people. But at times,
urgent questions of law and politics raise new questions about the
cultural consensus that already exists. This was clearly the case during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Discriminatory laws and
policies were themselves the problem that had to be addressed, and
religious leaders such as Martin Luther King did not hesitate to seek
to overcome the racist history of American culture by advocating
political and legal change directly. In the civil rights movement, argument about the larger cultural vision of the human good was stimulated by debate about specific policies. This seems to me a fully
45.
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legitimate example of religious engagement in the sphere of policy.
Similar examples, in my view, are the United States Catholic bishops' recent pastoral letters on war and peace and on economic justice. These raised fundamental questions about the values of
American society and culture in the context of addressing the more
detailed questions of policy regarding nuclear strategy, unemployment, and poverty.
Thus religious contributions to policy debates need not always
wait until a larger cultural consensus is achieved. Rather, public discourse between religious communities and the larger society will
move back and forth between larger cultural questions of value and
meaning on the one hand and more specific policy questions on the
other. The more general understandings of the human good present
in the culture and the more specific questions to be addressed in policy and law will mutually illuminate each other, both for religious
communities and for the larger society as well. In this way, a genuine public conversation about the social good might be generated. An
attempt to keep religious communities and convictions entirely separated from matters of policy will silence this conversation, especially
at moments when it is most urgently needed.
Only when such conversation occurs does a free society or a community of freedom really exist. Religious arguments have a proper
place in this conversation. And their presence should be governed by
the conditions necessary for all genuine conversation and mutual inquiry: pursuit of the truth and respect for the other in an atmosphere
of freedom. Such conditions, rather than neatly drawn lines or high
walls of separation, should determine the proper role of religious belief in a pluralistic and democratic society.

